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Two state cases touch on the deductibility of postproduction costs from 
royalty payments and Oklahoma’s definition of paying in producing 
quantities.  Also, a couple federal district courts rule on the proper way to 
rescind a contract and an exception to the Production Revenue Standards 
Act being the exclusive remedy for the incorrect payment of oil and gas 
proceeds.  Finally, Oklahoma amends portions of the Production Revenue 
Standards Act. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 * Matt Schlensker is of counsel in the Woodlands office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. 
Justin Fisher is a member in the Charleston office of Steptoe & Johnson PPLC. 
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1. Pummill v. Hancock Expl. LLC, 2018 OK CIV APP 48, 419 P.3d 1268 
(Okla. Civ. App. 2018). 
The Civil Court of Appeals issued an opinion concerning what types of 
costs may be deducted from royalty payments due to a lessor, reasserting 
Oklahoma’s approach to the implied covenant to market. 
Plaintiffs are the successors of the lessors of two 1966 oil and gas leases 
covering 160 acres in Grady County.
1
  The leases are now part of a 640 acre 
drilling and spacing unit, which has been producing natural gas since 1985.
2
  
One lease contained a “gross proceeds” royalty clause, and the other lease 
contained a “market price at the well” clause.3 
Defendants are the successors to the original lessees of the two leases.
4
  
They are non-operating working interest owners in the producing well, 
which is operated by Cimarex Energy Co. of Colorado.
5
  Since June of 
2005, Cimarex has marketed production from the well and distributed 
royalty proceeds.
6
 
Plaintiffs claim Defendants did not bear all of the costs necessary to 
market the gas and create a marketable product, while the Defendants 
argued the lease provisions negated the implied covenant to market.
7
  Also, 
Defendants requested the court declare the gas is “marketable at the custody 
transfer meter.”8  The meter connected to a gathering system owned by a 
group referred to as “Enogex,” which gathered and transported the gas to its 
off-lease processing plants.
9
  There, Enogex extracted natural gas liquids 
and delivered the residue gas for sale into high pressure pipelines.
10
  
Defendants specifically requested the court declare they could 
proportionately charge Plaintiffs for processing costs incurred at the 
Enogex plants and a determination that they could charge “any costs 
incurred for gas production” from the well so long as those costs met the 
requisites specified in Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.
11
 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Pummill, 2014 OK CIV APP at ¶ 4, 419 P.3d at 1270. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at ¶ 5, 419 P.3d at 1271. 
 5. Id. at ¶ 6, 419 P.3d at 1271. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8, 419 P.3d at 1271. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at ¶ 8, 419 P.3d at 1271. 
 11. Id. at ¶ 9, 419 P.3d at 1271. 
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The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, stating 
(1) the lease language did not abrogate the implied covenant to market, so 
gas royalty payments were “free of all costs to create a marketable 
product,” (2) Defendants’ use of a “percentage of proceeds” gas purchase 
contract with third parties instead of a “cash fee gathering agreement” did 
not affect the amount of royalty owed under the leases, and (3) Defendants 
owed Plaintiffs royalty on gas from the well “used off the lease or in the 
manufacture of products at the gas plant.”12 
Defendants appealed and in June of 2014, the Civil Court of Appeals 
unanimously affirmed the lower court’s decision.13  On appeal, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s decision and 
remanded the case back to the trial court.
14
  The Court wanted the lower 
court to resolve disputed fact issues concerning the three points noted 
above.
15
 
On remand, the trial court again found for the Plaintiffs, noting that 
neither lease describes any costs which may be charged against the lessor’s 
royalty.
16
  If a lessee wants to deduct costs for compression, gathering, or 
processing, the court noted the lessee should include that type of deduction 
language in the lease.
17
 
Also, the trial court rejected Defendants’ claim that the gas was a 
marketable product when it was produced from the well, finding the 
production was not complete until the gas was “delivered to the place of 
sale in marketable form.”18 
Also, even if the court agreed with Defendants’ marketability argument, 
it found the Defendants did not meet the criteria stated in Mittelstaedt: that 
the processing fees were reasonable, enhanced the value of an already 
marketable product, and increased royalty proceeds in proportion to the fee 
charged.
19
 
The Civil Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision and noted 
Defendants’ main contention is the trial court erred in finding the gas 
produced from the well was not a marketable product until the processing 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10, 419 P.3d at 1271-72. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at ¶ 12, 419 P.3d at 1272. 
 17. Id. at ¶ 13, 419 P.3d at 1272. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at ¶ 17, 419 P.3d at 1273. 
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had occurred at the plant.
20
  Defendants asked the court to adopt the Kansas 
definition of “marketable” to be “production is merchantable once the 
operator has put it into a condition acceptable to a purchaser in a good faith 
transaction.”21 
The court rejected the Kansas approach, noting it is undisputed that the 
gas from the well must be compressed and dehydrated to even be accepted 
into the Enogex pipeline.
22
  The gas must also undergo additional processes 
to be acceptable for delivery.
23
  Also, Defendants do not actually sell the 
gas until it reaches the pipeline.
24
  While Defendants argued there was a 
market at the wellhead, it seems to be a “purely hypothetical” market since 
no sales at the wellhead were even attempted.
25
 
The appellate court found the gas from the well was not an “already 
marketable product” as required by Mittelstaedt.26  The court found Fawcett 
to be inapplicable here because Mittelstaedt is controlling precedent; the 
Fawcett court did not overturn the rule that a lessee has a duty to make a 
marketable product, and in Fawcett, the gas was actually sold at the 
wellhead, instead of at the pipeline.
27
 
Also, the court found the Defendants did not even argue that they met all 
of the Mittelstaedt requirements, specifically that the postproduction costs 
increased the royalty revenues.
28
 
2. Hall v. Galmor, 2018 OK 59, No. 115078, 2018 WL 3133124 
(Okla. June 26, 2018). 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed how to determine if an oil and 
gas well is capable of producing in paying quantities and the effect of 
Oklahoma’s statutory Pugh clause. 
For more than 50 years, Galmor’s predecessors entered into thirty oil and 
gas leases covering lands in Beckham County, Oklahoma.
29
  Each lease 
included a primary term and a secondary term, making the leases effective 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at ¶ 20, 419 P.3d at 1274. 
 21. Id. at ¶ 29, 419 P.3d at 1276 (citing Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., of Kansas, 302 
Kan. 350, 352 P.3d 1032, 1034 (2015)). 
 22. Id. at ¶¶ 38-40, 419 P.3d at 1278. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at ¶ 41, 419 P.3d at 1278-79. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 44, 419 P.3d at 1279. 
 28. Id. at ¶ 47, 419 P.3d at 1279. 
 29. Hall, 2018 OK at ¶ 1. 
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for as long as oil or gas was produced from the leased premises.
30
  Twenty-
nine of those leases included “cessation of production” clauses, providing 
the lessee with a limited amount of time to re-establish production should a 
well cease production.
31
 
These leases included several different classes of production.
32
  Galmor’s 
predecessors drilled seven wells located on lands covered by fourteen of the 
leases.
33
  Two of those fourteen leases included lands that were also subject 
to voluntary pooling agreements with lands covered by six more leases but 
where no wells had been drilled.
34
  The remaining ten leases did not have 
any completed wells drilled on their lands, and they were not held by any 
pooling agreements or spacing units.
35
 
During the secondary terms of the fourteen leases with producing wells, 
six of the seven wells actually produced oil and gas.
36
  Some of those wells 
ceased production for “a number of years” during the 1990’s, but they later 
regained their previous production levels.
37
 
Galmor’s immediate predecessor, Marion Energy Inc. (“Marion”), 
stopped production from five of the producing wells in August of 2011, and 
a sixth well in January of 2012.
38
  The seventh well produced for six 
months before it was shut down in May of 2008, all for unclear reasons.
39
 
Soon after stopping production from the seven wells, Marion sought to 
sell all of its assets in Beckham and Greer Counties.
40
  First, Marion 
contacted Galmor about buying these assets, but Galmor declined due to the 
asking price.
41
  Marion also approached E.L. “Bo” Hall, d/b/a Hall Family 
Production (“Hall”), but Hall declined due to its concerns over “the 
marketability of title to the underlying leases and Marion Energy’s failure 
to market the product and/or pay shut-in royalties for the last three years.”42  
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at ¶¶ 2-4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 38. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 39. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 40. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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Then in October of 2014, Marion sold all of its assets to Galmor for a 
reduced price.
43
 
While negotiating with Marion, Hall acquired fifteen top leases covering 
many of the same lands as Marion’s fourteen bottom leases.44  In July of 
2014, before Marion sold its assets to Galmor, Hall notified Marion that it 
intended to take over operations of the seven wells and asked Marion to 
release its bottom leases.
45
  Marion refused and later completed its sale to 
Galmor.
46
 
In February of 2015, Hall sued Galmor, looking to invalidate the 
fourteen bottom leases and quiet title in favor of Hall’s fifteen top leases.47  
At the trial level, opposing engineering experts offered their opinions 
regarding the ability of the seven wells to produce in paying quantities.
48
  
Hall’s title attorney could not say definitively whether or not the wells were 
capable of production.
49
 
However, Hall himself, the owner of the top leases, took the stand and 
his attorney asked if Hall believed he could “produce seven wells in 
question here today in – in paying quantities?”50  Hall’s response: “It would 
pay to me.”51 
Based on that testimony, the trial court ruled in favor of Galmor that his 
bottom leases were still valid.
52
  Citing Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, the trial 
court stated a “lease will continue as long as the well is capable of 
production in paying quantities subject, of course, to any violation of any 
other express provisions such as the shut-in royalty clause or implied 
covenants such as the covenant to market.”53  The court also pointed out 
that a lessee must demand compliance with an implied covenant before a 
court will grant a forfeiture, and a stranger to the lease may not make such a 
demand.
54
  The court ruled all seven wells were capable of production 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at ¶ 9. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at ¶ 9-10. 
 53. Id. (citing Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 1994 OK 23, 869 P.2d 323 (Okla. 1994)). 
 54. Id. 
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during the period they were shut in and no demand to comply with an 
implied covenant was made by any of the royalty owners.
55
 
Hall argued the trial court should have quieted title in his favor for the 
ten leases which did not have any completed wells and were not subject to 
any pooling agreement (the “Non-Unit Leases”), as well as lands outside 
the 160 acre tracts where the seven wells are located (“Pugh Clause 
Lands”).56 
The Supreme Court defined production in paying quantities as an amount 
of production “sufficient to yield a profit to the lessee over operating 
expenses.”57  If a well is not actually producing, it only needs to be 
“capable of producing in paying quantities.”58  Hall argued the trial court 
should have defined “capable” as meaning “the well must be maintained in 
turn-key condition such that it will produce in paying quantities 
immediately upon being turned ‘on.’”59 
The Supreme Court rejected a rigid definition of the term “capable” and 
stated the only relevant time period for determining capability is the 
moment prior to the shutting-in of the well.
60
  As long as the well was 
capable of producing in paying quantities at the moment it was shut-in, the 
well remains “capable” throughout the shut-in period.61  The Court ruled 
operators do not need to “continually maintain their shut-in wells in turn-
key condition.”62 
Also, the Court ruled the seven wells were capable of producing in 
paying quantities, citing, inter alia, the “inference to be drawn from Hall’s 
purchase of top leases on these wells that these wells were perfectly good 
wells that were capable of producing in paying quantities,” and “Hall’s 
testimony that he could make the wells produce in paying quantities for 
him.”63 
Next, Hall argued that the trial court should have quieted title to the Pugh 
Clause Lands in his favor.
64
  He argued Oklahoma’s statutory Pugh clause 
requires all lands outside the 160 acre spacing units to be automatically 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at ¶ 14. 
 57. Id. at ¶ 22. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 60. Id. at ¶ 26. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at ¶ 28. 
 64. Id. at ¶ 43. 
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released from their leases ninety days after their primary terms expired, 
which would have been December of 2010.
65
 
Galmor responded that Hall was misapplying the statutory Pugh clause’s 
purpose of conservation and protection of correlative rights.
66
  Also, 
Galmor argued canceling these leasehold interests lying outside the spacing 
units would amount to an unconstitutional taking for private use.
67
 
The Court noted subpart (b) of the clause states: “In case of a spacing 
unit of one hundred sixty (160) acres or more, no oil and/or gas leasehold 
interest outside the spacing unit involved may be held by production from 
the spacing unit more than ninety (90) days beyond the expiration of the 
primary term of the lease.”68  The Court ruled this clause extinguishes all 
interests falling outside the spacing unit, even if those interests would 
usually be held by the habendum clause of the lease.
69
 
After a discussion of policy concerns, the Court found the statutory Pugh 
clause is not an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
70
  The Court reversed the lower court and ruled Galmor’s 
leasehold interests in the Pugh Clause Lands should be forfeited, and Hall’s 
interest in same should be quieted.
71
 
Finally, as to the Non-Unit Leases, the Court again reversed the lower 
court and ruled that since no wells were ever drilled on the lands covered by 
those leases, Galmor’s leasehold interests in same should be forfeited, and 
Hall’s interest in same should be quieted.72 
In the end, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected a rigid definition of 
“capability” with regards to production in paying quantities and ruled if a 
well is capable of production in paying quantities on the day it is shut-in, 
then it is considered capable throughout its shut-in period. 
3. Petroflow Energy Corp. v. Sezar Energy, L.P., No. 16-CV-700-TCK-JFJ, 
2017 WL 4399193 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 3, 2017). 
The Northern District of Oklahoma held a Participation Agreement could 
not be rescinded because neither party had even attempted to have the 
agreement rescinded. 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at ¶ 44. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at ¶ 46. 
 69. Id. at ¶ 51. 
 70. Id. at ¶¶ 52-66. 
 71. Id. at ¶¶ 67-69. 
 72. Id. at ¶ 70. 
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In June of 2014, Plaintiff entered into a “Central Prospect Participation 
Agreement” (“Agreement”) with Defendants Sezar Energy, L.P. and 
Brittany Energy, LLC (“Defendants”).73  Prior to the Agreement, the parties 
had both been independently drilling wells throughout eastern central 
Oklahoma, an area the parties referred to as the “Area of Mutual Interest,” 
or “AMI.”74 The Agreement was designed so the parties would jointly 
develop and exchange working interests within the AMI.
75
 
The Agreement indicated Plaintiff was entering into an agreement with 
Equal Energy, Ltd. scheduled to close by July 31, 2014 (the “Equal 
Acquisition”).76 Once that deal closed, Plaintiff would own multiple oil and 
gas leases within the AMI.
77
 The Agreement was effective June 15, 2014, 
but not “actionable” until the closing of the Equal Acquisition.78 The parties 
also entered into a Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”) which was 
incorporated into the Agreement.
79
 
The Agreement covered all Leasehold Interests within the AMI and 
provided that Plaintiff would sell a 30.00% working interest in the 
Properties to Defendants.
80
 The Agreement would not terminate if 
Defendants decided not to participate in any one lease and/or well in the 
AMI.
81
 Also, the JOA provided that if any Party acquired or contracted to 
acquire any oil and gas interest in the AMI, then the non-acquiring Party 
would have the opportunity to participate in that interest.
82
 
Plaintiff argued the Agreement required Defendants to pay their 
proportionate share of leasehold costs on certain undeveloped leases (the 
“Disputed Leases”).83 Defendants responded that they had no obligation 
regarding the Disputed Leases because same were “after-acquired” leases, 
and Plaintiff failed to provide Defendants with notice and an opportunity to 
participate in these leases pursuant to the JOA.
84
 Plaintiff argued the JOA is 
inapplicable to the Disputed Leases.
85
 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Petroflow, 2017 WL 4399193 at *1.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at *2. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at *3. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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Plaintiff sued alleging breach of contract concerning the Disputed 
Leases.
86
 Defendants provided an affirmative defense of failure of 
consideration.
87
 Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court noted that 
under Section 2.1 of the Agreement, Defendants agreed to buy undivided 
working interests in Properties relating to lands in the AMI.
88
 Section 2.2 
stated Defendants shall pay Plaintiff actual costs of the “leases, title and 
other costs associated with the Leasehold Interests” and “agree[] to further 
pay their proportionate share of all future Properties acquisition and force 
pooling costs necessary for the drilling of any subsequent well(s) in the 
AMI.”89 Plaintiff argued these provisions did not require a “participation 
notice with respect to future lease acquisitions . . . .”90 Also, Plaintiff argued 
the JOA did not apply to undeveloped leases, but rather the drilling of 
wells.
91
 
Defendants argued Plaintiff must provide notice with respect to any lease 
it acquires within the AMI because the Agreement does not state how 
“future Properties acquisition” occurs.92  Also, in the event of a conflict, the 
JOA prevails over the Agreement.
93
 
The court ruled the Defendants did not reference any language in the 
Agreement requiring Plaintiff to provide a participation notice to 
Defendants regarding undeveloped leases.
94
  The court refused to infer that 
the JOA notice provision would govern any “future Properties 
acquisition.”95  Since Defendants could not show the JOA applied to 
undeveloped leases as a matter of law, the court denied Defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment.
96
 
Regarding Defendants’ failure of consideration defense, the court denied 
that motion as well.
97
 Defendants argued they could rescind the Agreement 
because Plaintiff “unreasonably delayed assigning leases to Defendants 
until they had expired or would soon expire, and as a result, the majority of 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at *4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at *5. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at *6. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at *5. 
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the Disputed Leases had little to no value by the time they were assigned to 
Defendants.”98 
The court noted that under Oklahoma law, a party seeking rescission of a 
contract must rescind same “promptly, upon discovering the facts which 
entitle him to rescind” and “must restore to [him] everything of value which 
he has received from him under the contract . . . .”99 Defendants obtained 
working interests in leases under the Agreement and received their share of 
revenues from those leases; however, Defendants did not attempt to rescind 
the Agreement.
100
 Therefore, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment.
101
 
4. McClintock v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., No. CIV-16-136-KEW, 2018 WL 
1547373 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 2018). 
This district court ruled Oklahoma’s Production Revenue Standards Act 
is the exclusive remedy for nonpayment or underpayment of royalties, with 
a specific exception. 
Plaintiff alleged she owned some oil and gas wells in Oklahoma.
102
  
ExxonMobil operated some producing wells in Oklahoma where it was 
obligated to pay oil and gas proceeds to Plaintiff.
103
  Enterprise Crude Oil, 
LLC was the first purchase of production from those wells, and it was also 
alleged to be obligated to pay oil and gas proceeds to Plaintiff.
104
 
Plaintiff argued Defendants were legally obligated to pay interest on 
untimely payments to royalty owners, but Defendants “routinely delay 
payment of production proceeds and deny Owners the interest payments to 
which they are entitled as part of an overarching scheme to avoid its 
obligations under Oklahoma law.”105 
Plaintiff claimed the proper payments of royalty proceeds and interest, as 
well as asserting a claim for fraud. Plaintiff alleged Defendants “knowingly 
and intentionally suppressed the fact that interest was owed to Plaintiff” and 
“intended to avoid their obligation to pay the statutorily mandated interest 
and only pay when an Owner specifically requests payment of the statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. McClintock, 2018 WL 1547373 at *1. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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interest.”106  Also, Plaintiff stated she “relied on and trusted Defendants to 
pay them the full O&G Proceeds to which they were entitled under 
Oklahoma law.”107 
Enterprise requested a dismissal of Plaintiff’s common law fraud claim 
and argued (1) the Energy Litigation Reform Act (the “Reform Act”) 
specifically precluded Plaintiff from pursuing the fraud claim because of its 
“exclusive remedy” language; and (2) even if the fraud claim is allowed to 
proceed, Plaintiff’s allegations are not actionable fraud in Oklahoma.108 
The Reform Act provides the Production Revenue Standards Act (the 
“PRSA”) “shall provide the exclusive remedy to a person entitled to 
proceeds from production for failure of a holder to pay the proceeds within 
the time periods required for payment.”109  The PRSA specifies interest due 
for failure to properly pay proceeds, and the Reform Act indicates same is 
an adequate remedy and no other penalty or damages shall be recoverable, 
unless a finder of fact determines by clear and convincing evidence that the 
party which failed to pay proceeds did so with the “actual, knowing and 
willful intent: (a) to deceive the person to whom the proceeds were due, or 
(b) to deprive proceeds from the person the holder knows, or is aware, is 
legally entitled thereto.”110 
Enterprise argued Plaintiff may only seek the remedies provided in the 
PRSA.
111
  Plaintiff argued she may pursue any claim under Oklahoma law 
if the showing of intent and deception is made as required by the Reform 
Act.
112
  The court noted there is almost no case authority to interpret this 
part of Oklahoma law, but its duty is to give the statute its plain and 
unambiguous meaning.
113
 
The court ruled the state legislature clearly intended the remedies in the 
PRSA to be the exclusive remedies a party may seek concerning incorrect 
payment of oil and gas proceeds.
114
 However, the legislature created an 
exception for other types of remedies when it is determined that the 
operator failed to pay proceeds with “actual, knowing and willful intent.”115 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at *2. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at *3. 
 109. Id. at *2. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at *3. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at *4. 
 115. Id. 
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Therefore, the court allowed Plaintiff to maintain her fraud claim until a 
finder of fact has the opportunity to determine if Defendants acted with 
such intent.
116
 
Also, Enterprise argued it had no duty to disclose to Plaintiff whether she 
was entitled to interest under the PRSA, and therefore Plaintiff’s claim does 
not meet the criteria for a fraud claim in Oklahoma.
117
 After citing those 
criteria, the court determined Plaintiff’s complaint had enough detail to 
provide Defendants with notice of the allegations.
118
 
H.B. 2775, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2018). 
The Oklahoma legislature amended the Production Revenue Standards 
Act (the “Act”) regarding marketable title and interest payments for unpaid 
oil and gas proceeds. The Act sets forth when an operator must pay oil and 
gas proceeds to royalty owners and how much interest accrues when an 
operator fails to make such payments in a timely manner.
119
 
Previously, if a person did not have marketable title, an operator was 
charged six percent interest for non-payment of proceeds.  HB 2775 
amended the Act to provide for the scenario where a portion of a person’s 
interest may be marketable, while the remaining portion of their interest 
may not be marketable.  Also, effective November 1, 2018, HB 2775 
amended the six percent interest penalty for non-marketable title to the 
prime interest rate as reported in the Wall Street Journal. 
Finally, where marketability remains uncured, or the operator has not 
been provided with an acceptable affidavit of heirship which conforms to 
Section 67 of Title 16 of the Oklahoma Statutes, for a period of 120 days 
from the date payment is due, HB 2775 allows the operator to elect to 
interplead the proceeds into a court to determine the persons legally entitled 
to the proceeds. 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. H.B. 2775. 
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